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Abstract 
This thesis creates a new variable for threat perception built upon psychological concepts and 
then applies this new variable to the question of why leaders use military force in certain 
situations. The concept of threat perception has a long history in the field in terms of its effect on 
leaders choosing to use military force. However, while the concept of threat perception is 
inherently psychological, previous proxies for the variable have included only situational factors, 
which is highly problematic. By utilizing the Operational Code, this study creates a new threat-
perception variable based on cognitive constructs. Using a sample of US presidents, this new 
variable is tested in two different ways. The first examines three psychological characteristics 
(need for power, in-group bias, and distrust) from Leadership Trait Analysis that are thought to 
influence the level of threat perception in a leader. The second examines threat perception as an 
explanatory variable for the use of force alongside three other important control variables 
(economic violence, presidential popularity, and US power). The use of force variable is derived 
from Meernik’s Use of Force dataset with each case in the dataset representing an opportunity to 
use force. The psychological data are derived from the verbal material of US presidents using at-
a-distance methods found in the literature. OLS regression and probit are used to model the 
research questions. The project finds that levels of threat perception are indeed affected by a 
leader’s level of distrust, in-group bias, and need for power. In addition, the new 
psychologically-derived threat-perception variable is a very good predictor of a president’s use 
of force: presidents with higher levels of threat perception have a much higher probability of 
using force when the situation presents an opportunity. 
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Introduction 
The primary focus of this paper is to examine the effect that threat perception has on the 
decision to use, or not use, military force. In international relations, the topic that has always 
received the most attention and research has been the area of war and other uses of military 
force. There are many reasons why this is. War, at a basic level, is devastating to the 
international system. It can lead to a massive loss of life, the breakup and change of territorial 
lines, and it can disrupt normal flows of trade and people. While a large amount of the literature 
is dedicated to the proceedings of war, there is also a large amount of the research that has gone 
into determining why countries choose to go to war. These explanations range from realist 
perspectives, to political psychology, to the security dilemma, and many more.  
One of the more interesting explanations for why countries choose to go to war is threat 
perception. This explanation has been in the literature for many years and has had multiple 
hypotheses as to how threat perception operates. Threat perception is the amount that a leader 
perceives another country’s military strength and intent of action to be threatening to their own 
territory or strategic interests. While this may seem straight forward, it has been difficult to find a 
reliable measure, or variable, for threat perception. For that reason, this present study will 
investigate a way to quantify threat perception in the hopes that a reliable measure can be applied 
to future cases. Before proceeding to the specifics of this study, it is necessary to further 
introduce the concepts of threat perception, as well as a few concepts from other aspects of 
political psychology. 
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Literature Review 
 
Before moving on to the present study, it is important to understand the development of 
threat perception in the literature. Threat perception can take on many different meanings 
depending on how you define it. While earlier studies have dealt with objective measures of 
threat, later studies have shifted the focus back to perception. For that reason, this review will 
look at several different studies to understand how the concept of threat perception has changed 
over time. 
While threat perception wasn’t formally studied until the 1900s, there are several 
instances in history where threat perception has been discussed. The first case of the study of 
threat perception is often linked to the Greek Historian Thucydides, who examined the 
Peloponnesian War that took place between Sparta and Athens. As he examined the conflict, he 
noted that “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this 
caused in Sparta” (Thucydides, 1985). The important part of this statement for threat perception 
is the process of identification of an opposing power and the emotional response this caused. 
Sparta perceived an increasing threat from Athens, whether correct or not, and responded with an 
action they deemed appropriate. In sum, Thucydides introduced an aspect of decision-making 
that was previously not considered in terms of the study of war. 
The next early study of threat perception comes from Machiavelli and his work, The 
Prince. Throughout his work, Machiavelli stresses the importance of material factors, such as 
wealth and military strength, in assessing the strength of a country. By this regard, a leader must 
always be aware of situations that may threaten his or her own wealth, military strength, or 
interests. Additionally, he argues that leaders should always be prepared for war and pursue any 
opportunity that may bring monetary gains (Machiavelli, 1532/1981). Put together, Machiavelli 
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stressed the importance of objective factors and was primarily concerned with preserving and 
increasing a state’s power at any cost.  
Moving on from these earlier studies, the first major work in the study of threat 
perception was done by Singer (1958). In his work, Singer examined the ways in which certain 
actions can be seen as threatening to other countries. By looking at several case studies, Singer 
was able to identify a working formula for threat perception as the product of estimated 
capability and estimated intent. While the first part of the formula is objective, the second part 
relies on how an action will be perceived. This perception mainly relies on image theory as a 
military move by an ally may be seen as mutual defense while a similar military move by an 
enemy may be seen as an indication for an upcoming attack. Though there were some limitations 
as his study relied on case studies, his work was vitally important to creating and continuing the 
conversation of threat perception. 
Building off of Singer, Pruitt focused his study of threat perception on the initial 
“predispositions” that a leader may hold of another country. From these predispositions, leaders 
are able to understand the actions of another more clearly. From there, Pruitt argues that there is 
“evidence of intent” that can be studied in order to understand threat perception more clearly. 
The “evidence of intent” involves capability (amount of arms that a state may possess), actions, 
statements, and conditions faced by other nations (Pruitt, 1965). Though this provides an 
expanded view of Singer’s view, it still has the problem of actually identifying the process of 
what causes a leader to experience threat perception.  
Moving on from Pruitt, Cohen argues that threat perception is a two-step process 
consisting of observation and appraisal. The first step is objective and involves the basic 
components of the action that has just happened. The second part is the subject meaning that is 
 4 
 
added to the news that informs a person of the intent of the action. The important addition to this 
understanding of threat perception is that it introduces the presence of active thought within a 
person (Cohen, 1978; Cohen, 1979). However, this study focuses more on defining actions that 
can be seen as threatening cues rather than the internal processes of a person’s perception. Put 
another way, the units of measure are actions rather than psychological concepts.  
From this point in the literature, the study of threat perception branched out into multiple 
areas as it became used as a medium in the explanation of other phenomena. While Image theory 
was mentioned earlier with Singer, another area where threat perception was used is the study of 
the security dilemma. This concept, developed by Jervis in 1978, argues that a state’s need to 
maintain a balance of power means that any imbalance created by an increase in arms in another 
state must be met with an increase in your own state. The end result of such an occurrence is that 
both states are captured in an arms race that greatly increases the likelihood of an eventual 
outbreak of conflict. Threat perception plays a role in this dilemma as it is possible that a leader 
may misperceive the amount that an opposing side increases their military or the actual intention 
for the military buildup. This important distinction can greatly impact the cycle of the security 
dilemma and can increase the severity of the cycle (Glaser 1997; He, 2012). 
Alongside the other examples of threat perception, emotions is another area where threat 
perception can play a big role. The main emotion that has been examined is fear and the effect 
that it plays on threat perception (Page, 1931). In multiple cases, it has been shown that fear of 
an outside state can lead to a heightened sense of threat perception. This, in turn, leads to a 
subscription to harsher policies to deal with the possibility of a threat (Stein 2013; Obaidi, Kunst, 
Kteily, Thomsen, and Sidanius, 2018; Semenova and Winter 2019; Dunwoody and McFarland 
2018; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006).  
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Recently, there is a growing group of studies that examines the existence of threat 
perception among the general public. This is often encapsulated within studies that examine 
views of Islam and terrorism. These studies utilize surveys targeted at people in the general 
population of a country to understand their attitudes and feelings towards other groups. They also 
focus on the distinction between realistic threats (territory, resources) and symbolic threats 
(beliefs, values) as the target of a threat may alter a person’s reaction to it (Obaidi, et. al 2018; 
Riek, et. al 2006). Additionally, there is some research to suggest that a person’s level of 
religiosity may affect their threat perception as they view certain events (Hampton, 2013). While 
it may be interesting to view current levels of threat perception in the general public to 
understand the support of authoritarian policies, it is important to understand that these people 
are not directly involved in the decision-making process. Furthermore, it is hard to determine 
actual psychological levels of threat perception from a survey where people may alter their true 
answers to please the examiner.  
The main point to take away from a review of the threat perception literature is that most 
studies do not actually study threat perception as it is often conceptualized. Studies will either 
focus on public opinion or case studies that focus on structural variables that are removed from 
the leader making the decision. Threat perception is studied through proxy variables that do not 
actually measure threat perception as a psychological process in a leader. In spite of this, there 
are still several important things to consider in this review. The first is that threat perception 
deals with hostile views of opposing countries. Threat perception also involves an understanding 
that the opposing country will generally impede on a state’s strategic interests. Finally, there is a 
sense that leaders will often view threatening actions as outside of their own immediate control. 
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Considering these aspects, this present study will attempt to introduce a variable that measures 
threat perception within leaders.  
Profiling Leaders: Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code 
As mentioned at the beginning, this paper will examine threat perception through the lens 
of political psychology. Specifically, two areas of political psychology need to be introduced 
before moving on to the rest of this paper. The first of these methods is Leadership Trait 
Analysis (LTA) that was developed by Hermann in 1977. Within LTA, there are seven 
psychological characteristics that are used to provide a description of a leader’s psychology. The 
seven characteristics are need for power, distrust, in-group bias, conceptual complexity, belief in 
the ability to control events, self-confidence, and task orientation. These characteristics span both 
personality traits, motives, and cognition of a leader to get a full image of that leader’s style of 
leadership.  
The other method of political psychology contained in this paper is Operational Code. 
Operational Code was developed by Leites (1953) and was then further developed by George 
(1969). This method deals with a leader’s beliefs about himself (instrumental beliefs) and the 
nature of the political universe (philosophical beliefs). In sum, there are 10 questions identified 
that draw out the belief system of a leader. By examining these beliefs, we are able to understand 
how a leader makes a decision in terms of how they will view a potential problem and the best 
strategies they can employ to overcome the problem. 
Though both of these methods seem straightforward, implementation of these methods 
can be difficult as leaders often can’t be reached to take a personality and cognitive test. To get 
around this problem, both methods use verbal analysis of the leaders in order to glean 
psychological characteristics. By analyzing the use of certain words and other verbal 
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constructions, it is possible to understand their core characteristics. The Operational Code uses a 
method known as Verbs in Context System (VICS), which was developed by Walker, Schafer, 
and Young in 1998. The Leadership Trait Analysis focuses on words and phrases to ascertain the 
psychological characteristics of a leader. Since verbal material is going to be used, it is important 
to consider which kind of speech acts will be used. There are two types of speech acts: 
spontaneous and prepared. Prepared speeches refer to speeches given at major addresses that are 
often organized in part by a speechwriter. On the other hand, spontaneous speech acts are given 
with little to no preparation and are typically found in interview and other question-answer 
formats. For the purposes of this study, both spontaneous and prepared speeches will be 
considered for the leaders involved. While there is the question of whether speeches by 
speechwriters truly represent the leader, it can be argued that speechwriters are hired to write 
speeches that are typical of the leader they are writing for. Additionally, there have been studies 
that have shown there is little difference between the results of spontaneous and prepared 
speeches (Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Rosati, 2000). Therefore, this study will use both 
prepared and spontaneous speeches for the analysis of threat perception. 
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Research Design 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect that threat perception has on the decision to 
use military force in a given situation. Rather than utilize situational variables for threat 
perception, this study will use certain parts of the Operational Code as a variable for threat 
perception. This variable was selected as it will assess the role of psychology of the leader in the 
decision-making process. Specifically, Operational Code allows us to examine a leader’s way of 
thinking as it relates to him/herself and the international system. 
Since threat perception relies on the perception of outside threats, the variable will consist of 
several measures from the philosophical beliefs of the Operational Code. First, P-1 is a measure 
that indicates a leader’s understanding of the essential nature of political life, whether it be 
hostile or friendly (George, 1969). This measure is a scale that ranges from -1 to +1, with hostile 
beliefs existing on the lower end of the scale and friendly beliefs existing on the upper end of the 
scale (Walker, Schafer, Young, 2003). A leader who views the world as hostile is likely to 
experience a higher level of threat perception. Conversely, a leader who views the world as 
friendly is likely to experience a lower level of threat perception. Thus, greater threat perception 
will be related to the lower end of the P-1 scale, while lesser threat perception will be related to 
the upper end of the P-1 scale. 
The next measure that will be included in the variable for threat perception is P-2. P-2 
indicates the leader’s expectations (optimistic/pessimistic) for realizing stated goals or objectives 
(George, 1969). Like P-1, P-2 ranges from -1 to +1, with pessimism relating to the lower end of 
the scale and optimism relating to the upper end of the scale (Walker et. al, 2003). A leader who 
experiences a great amount of threat perception is likely to believe that their strategic goals are 
going to be harder to obtain. On the other hand, a leader who does not experience a great level of 
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threat perception may believe that it will be easier to achieve goals without the interference of 
other countries. Thus, greater threat perception will be related to the lower end of the P-2 scale, 
while lesser threat perception will be related to the upper end of the P-2 scale. 
The final measure that will be included in the variable for threat perception is P-4. P-4 
indicates a leader’s perceived control over events (George, 1969). Put another way, it looks into 
whether a leader believes he or she has a higher or lower sense of control over political events. 
This measure is scaled from 0 to +1, with low control over political events relating to the lower 
end of the scale, and high control over political events on the upper end of the scale (Walker et. 
al, 2003). Since leaders who score on the lower end believe that they have little control over the 
flow of political events, a leader is likely to see threats as outside of his or her control. Thus, a 
leader is likely to have a heightened sense of threat perception. Conversely, a leader who scores 
on the upper end believes that he or she has high control over the flow of political events. 
Though a leader may be faced with various threats, he or she will understand these threats and 
have a firm grasp on how to control future developments. Therefore, greater threat perception 
will be related to the lower end of the P-4 scale, while lesser threat perception will be related to 
the upper end of the P-4 scale. 
In order to create the variable for threat perception, the three measures from Operational 
Code will need to be combined. To ensure that there is consistency among the various scales of 
measurement, each individual score will first be standardized against an overall mean. Once the 
scores are standardized, the scores will be added together to create one number that represents 
the level of threat perception experienced by the leader. Finally, the combined score will be 
multiplied by -1. The reason for this last operation is based on the way that the Operational Code 
scales are set up in relation to this study. Since the lower end of the three scales are related to 
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greater threat perception, this final operation will ensure that higher numbers on the combined 
score relate to a greater level of threat perception. The individual measures will be pulled from 
the Presidential database of psychological characteristics and will be based on speech analysis of 
both spontaneous and prepared speech acts given by the leaders selected.  
With the threat perception variable created, it is important to make sure that it is 
represented by psychological characteristics. More specifically, I am interested in understanding 
the psychological causes of threat perception. I argue that there are deeper psychological factors 
that predispose a person’s level of threat perception. These factors are rooted in personality 
characteristics that are central to a person’s identity. In order to assess the relationship between 
personality characteristics and threat perception, I will utilize Margaret Hermann’s Leadership 
Trait Analysis. Specifically, the three characteristics that will be assessed are need for power, 
distrust, and in-group bias.  
Need for power is one of the three main motivations identified by Winter (1973). This 
psychological characteristic denotes a leader’s need to establish and maintain their own power 
and sense of control over events (Hermann 2002). Since leaders with a high need for power 
would want to exert their dominance over situations, it is likely that they will be more sensitive 
to situations that would threaten their dominance. Thus, the hypothesis for this relationship can 
be described as:  
H1: A leader with a higher need for power will likely experience a higher level of threat 
perception. 
Distrust is another important psychological characteristic of LTA. Distrust deals with 
suspicion and doubt of others’ intentions and actions (Hermann 2002). As distrustful leaders can 
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be more inclined to see others’ actions as suspect, the relationship to threat perception can be 
described as: 
H2: A leader with a higher level of distrust will likely experience a greater level of threat 
perception. 
Finally, in-group bias is another important psychological characteristic to consider from 
LTA. In-group bias denotes the level that a leader will hold his own group higher than everyone 
else (Hermann, 2002). This can be built upon economic, cultural, or military reasons and usually 
results in the desire to make decisions that benefit the group. As such, the relationship between 
in-group bias and threat perception can be described as: 
H3: A leader with higher levels of in-group bias will likely experience a higher level of threat 
perception. 
After establishing the psychological characteristics that influence threat perception, the 
rest of the study will examine the effects that threat perception has on the use of force. In terms 
of the use of force, the dependent variable comes from Meernik’s Use of Force dataset (2004) 
that examines the US’s decision to use or not use military force in a given situation. Rather than 
focus on cases where military force was absolutely required or absolutely not required, this 
dataset focuses on cases where the leader has the opportunity to use military force.  The use of 
military force is coded as a dummy variable with 1 being the use of force and 0 being no use of 
force. In his dataset, he was interested in examining the effect of several situational variables, 
such as presidential approval ratings, economic aid to the targeted country, inflation, and relative 
power. The dataset ranges from 1948 to 1998 and includes 605 individual cases that were 
identified as situations that created an opportunity for a leader to use military force. The criteria 
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for determining if there is an opportunity to use force are defined by Job and Ostrom as 
possessing one of the following five distinctions:  
1. The threat is made to the territorial security of the US, its allies, or proxies 
2. There is a danger to US citizens, diplomats, military personnel, or US assets 
3. The situation would result in the advancement of ideologies opposed to the US 
4. The situation would result in a loss of US influence in a region 
5. The situation involved an inter-state dispute or general disruption that could lead to many 
deaths or threaten the stability of a region (Job and Ostrom 1986). 
The unit of analysis for this paper will be based on each opportunity to use force as identified 
by the Meernik dataset. Each row of the Meernik dataset designates the year and month of the 
opportunity to use force. To ensure that the study captures the psychology of the president while 
avoiding endogeneity with the case, the Operational Code measures are taken from the speeches 
that the leader gave four to six months before the decision was made. For instance, if a leader 
had an opportunity to use military force in April of 1957, then the Operational Code measures 
will consist of speeches from October-December of 1956. Based on these selection criteria, the 
actual number of cases that used for this study is 555. 
Overall, the main hypothesis in the study is: 
H4: The higher the level of the threat perception, the more likely the leader will use military 
force. 
To further test this new variable, several control variables are included to account for 
several common explanations in international relations for the use of force. All three of the 
control variables are a part of Meernik’s dataset. The first control is US Power as measured by 
the Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) variable. This variable 
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measures several aspects of power such as total population, iron and steel production, military 
expenditure and personnel that all contribute to measuring a country’s share of global power. It is 
expected that a country with a greater share of global power will be likely to exercise that power 
in multiple situations. Thus, a high CINC score should correlate with a higher probability of the 
use of force. The next control variable is presidential popularity as measured by an annual 
average of presidential approval ratings. A president who is unpopular may be incentivized to 
use force as a distraction from his administration. Thus, I expect lower approval ratings to 
correlate with more use of force. Finally, the last control variable is economic violence against 
the US. This is a categorical variable that tracks whether a threat is made against US economic 
interests. It is expected that a threat made against the economic interests of the US would 
incentivize the use of force to protect this vital area (Meernik, 2004). 
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Results 
As this paper is dealing with two main models, the results portion will also be broken up 
into two separate sections. The first section will look at the ability of psychological 
characteristics to predispose the level of threat perception a leader may experience. The second 
section will examine the way in which threat perception may play a role in a leader’s decision to 
use force when given the opportunity.  
Before moving on to the models, it is important to ensure that the threat perception 
variable is properly set up. By properly set up, I mean that there is evidence to support the 
inclusion of the three Operational Code measures that make up threat perception. In order to test 
this, I ran a Cronbach’s alpha test to determine if there was enough internal consistency between 
the three Operational Code measures used for the threat perception variable. The result of this 
test can be seen in Table 4 in the appendix. This test resulted in an alpha of 0.7536, which is 
greater than the traditional cutoff of 0.70. Though it is possible to improve this score by 
eliminating one of the operational code variables, I proceeded with the three variables as they 
cover more dynamic aspects that make up threat perception.  
Model 1: LTA and Threat Perception 
For the first part of this analysis, I ran a least-squares regression consisting of all three of 
the Leadership Trait Analysis variables discussed earlier. As a review, the hypotheses for this 
model are that an increase in need for power, in-group bias, and distrust will lead to an increase 
in threat perception. Before running the regression, I went through the Pearson correlations to 
make sure that there were no two variables that correlated highly. The results of this check can 
be seen in Table 5 in the appendix. While there are significant correlations, none of the 
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correlations are large enough to bring concern about using all three of the variables in the 
regression. 
With the correlations check completed, the results of the regression can be seen in Table 
1. In terms of the overall model, the global F test is significant. Thus, there is evidence that the 
level of threat perception is reliant upon deeper psychological characteristics. With the overall 
model significant, the next step is to examine the individual variables. To begin, the need for 
power parameter estimate is significant. However, the direction of the parameter estimate is 
opposite to what was expected. Though I traditionally explain the parameters in terms of 1 unit 
increases, I will explain the parameters in terms of .1 unit increases as the scales for need for 
power, in-group bias, and distrust range from 0 to 1. Therefore, for every .1 unit increase in need 
for power, the level of threat perception would decrease by 1.484. Put another way, a higher need 
for power leads to a lower level of threat perception. Though this may seem contrary to 
expectation, I will discuss possible reasons for this result later in the conclusion of this paper. 
Table 1: Results of the regression model for LTA characteristics and Threat Perception 
 
Variable Estimate p 
Need for Power -14.8444*** 
(4.45) 
0.0009 
In-Group Bias 5.669+ 
(3.5572) 
0.1116 
Distrust 27.796*** 
(2.2956) 
<0.0001 
Key: + = p<0.2, * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01 
R2= 0.2491, F-value = 60.93***, Standard Error in parentheses 
 
After need for power, the parameter for in-group bias is close to significance at an alpha 
level of 0.10. Even though this result is not significant, the parameter is in the direction that was 
expected. For every .1 unit increase in in-group bias, threat perception increases by .567. 
Therefore, a higher level of in-group bias leads to a higher level of threat perception. Finally, the 
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parameter for distrust is in the direction that was expected and is highly significant. For every .1 
unit increase in distrust, threat perception will increase by 2.78. This means that a higher level of 
distrust leads to a higher level of threat perception.  
Before finishing up this section, it is important to consider the goodness-of-fit of this 
model. The R2 value for this regression is 0.2491, which means that approximately 24.9% of the 
variation in the threat perception variable can be explained by the three LTA variables. Though 
this is just one measure of a goodness-of-fit, this result suggests that need for power, distrust, and 
in-group bias do have a large role in determining the level of threat perception when compared 
with the typical 10% benchmark used in other studies (Falk and Miller, 1992). Overall, there is 
evidence that the new threat perception variable is rooted in psychological characteristics: higher 
levels of in-group bias and distrust seem to relate positively with threat perception, while need 
for power has a negative relationship with threat perception. 
Model 2: Threat Perception and the Use of Force 
Now that the origins of threat perception have been investigated, the rest of this analysis 
will examine threat perception as an explanatory variable for the use of force. In essence, I argue 
that a higher level of threat perception will increase the chances that a leader will use force. The 
following section will be divided into two subsections. The first model looks at threat perception 
as the only independent variable. By doing so, the effect of threat perception can be isolated and 
examined. The second model includes several control variables that were mentioned in the 
research design. This model will investigate the effects of threat perception while controlling for 
other common explanations of the use of force. 
Since the use of force is a categorical variable, a probit model is utilized. While there are 
many differences between regular regression and probit, the main thing to note is the 
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interpretation of the parameter estimate. Rather than represent an increase or decrease in the 
dependent variable, the parameter estimates in probit models represent an increase or decrease in 
the z-score based on a normal curve. This result then translates into the probability that an event 
will occur when considering the value of the independent variable. If the parameter in a model is 
+1.0, this would then correspond to a z-score of 1.0. Referencing a normal cure, we can then say 
that there is an 84% chance that the outcome will occur based on the value of the independent 
variable.  
To begin, the results of the first model with threat perception as the only independent 
variable are shown in Table 3. With a p-value of .052, at an alpha level of 0.10, there is evidence 
to support my hypothesis. According to the parameter estimate, a one unit increase in threat 
perception increases the z-score by 0.0435. Put another way, when threat perception is 1, the 
likelihood of the use of force is 51.57%. When threat perception is -1, the likelihood of the use of 
force is 48.43%. In addition to the parameter estimate, it is important to consider how often this 
model will accurately predict the correct response. For that reason, I use the c-value as it gives a 
percentage related to the number of times that the model works correctly, or matches up with the 
actual response. For instance, the model is correct if a higher value corresponds to the use of 
force. On the other hand, the model also works if a lower values corresponds to no use of force. 
The c-model takes all the cases where the model works properly and divides them by the total 
number of cases. For this model, the c-value is 0.554. This means that the model will predict the 
correct response 55.4% of the time, which is slightly better than random 50-50 selection. Thus, 
this model shows that threat perception does have a role in the decision to use force. A higher 
level of threat perception makes the use of force more likely. 
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Table 2: Probit model for Threat Perception and the Use of Force  
 
Variable Estimate p 
Threat Perception 0.0435* 
(0.0224) 
0.0523 
Key: + = p<0.2, * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01 
c=0.554, Standard Error in Parentheses 
 
While threat perception has been shown to be a significant predictor of the use of force 
on its own, it is important to consider it in terms of other variables from the field of international 
relations that can be important in determining the use of force. For this purpose, the control 
variables that will be tested are US Power, President Popularity, and Economic Violence. Before 
running this model, it is important to make sure that there is no possibility of threat perception 
being closely tied to any of the other variables in the model. As the new variable for threat 
perception should be different from previous measures of threat perception, it is important to 
make sure the variables in the model are not correlated in any major way. The results of the 
Pearson correlation check can be seen in Table 6 in the appendix. While there is some 
significance between threat perception and US Power, the relationship is not large enough to 
warrant any caution. Other than threat perception, the main relationship that could be concerning 
is the significant correlation between US power and Presidential popularity. Though it is 
significant, the relationship is again not very strong. Thus, it is acceptable to use these variables 
in the same model without the possibility of an independent variable affecting another 
independent variable. 
The results of the second model can be seen in Table 4. First off, the threat perception 
variable is significant at the 0.05 alpha level. Based on the estimate, a one unit increase in threat 
perception will lead to a 0.0525 increase in the z-score. This means that an increase in threat 
perception will increase the likelihood of a president using force in a given situation, similar to 
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the previous result. Though not the main interest of this study, Presidential popularity and 
Economic violence are also significant predictors of the use of force. For Presidential popularity, 
a greater average annual approval rating leads to an increase in the likelihood of the use of force, 
which is opposite of the diversionary effect that was predicted. Though this may be 
contradictory, there is further evidence from James and Oneal (1991) that would suggest that an 
increase in Presidential popularity would increase the likelihood of the use of force. A possible 
reason for this may be that a President who is popular may feel that he has the support necessary 
to explore different opportunities by using force. Moving on, the presence of economic violence 
also increases the likelihood of the use of force. This result is understandable as an economic 
interest that is threatened is likely to bring a swift response. Finally, the CINC variable, as 
represented by power, is not significant and did not go in direction that was expected. Though it 
is not significant, the estimate suggests that a high CINC score will relate to a lower likelihood of 
the use of force. While this may seem contradictory, it is important to remember that CINC is 
based on the global share and is subject to the diffusion of power concentration as we move from 
the end of World War 2 through to the post-Cold War world. Overall, there is evidence that 
threat perception is a significant predictor of the use of force. A higher level of threat perception 
makes the use of force more likely. 
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Table 3: Probit model for Threat Perception and control variables for the Use of Force 
 
Variable Estimate p %Change in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Threat Perception 0.0525** 
(0.0299) 
0.0217 16.93% 
US Power -1.5458+ 
(1.1033) 
0.1612 -10.41% 
Presidential 
Popularity 
0.00835* 
(0.00438) 
0.0567 14.37% 
Economic Violence 0.7583** 
(0.2413) 
0.0017 15.62% 
Key: + = p<0.2, * = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01 
c=0.606, Standard Error in Parentheses 
 
 As with the previous model, another key area to consider with this model is how well it 
predicts actual behavior. Again, this check will rely on the c-value, which is listed in table 4. The 
c-value indicates the percentage of cases where the model accurately predicts the response. For 
this model, 60.6% of the cases are predicted correctly, which is better than the previous model. 
This increase is the result of the inclusion of more variables, which allow for a better prediction 
model. Thus, this model is worthwhile as it is better at predicting the correct response than 
random 50-50 selection. 
 Though it is important to make sure that the model is a good fit for predicting behavior, it 
is important to be sure that threat perception is actually making a meaningful difference in the 
likelihood of using force. To understand this effect, a predicted probabilities check on the threat 
perception variable can help visualize how a change in the variable affects the probability of 
using force while holding the other variables constant. Table 3 shows the result of this check 
with threat perception ranging from its minimum value to its maximum value. When threat 
perception is at its minimum, there is a 70.21% chance that the leader will use force. When threat 
perception is at its maximum, there is an 87.14% chance that the leader will use force. This 
means that there is a 16.93% increase in the chance of the use of force as the threat perception 
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changes from its minimum to its maximum. In order to judge how much of a change in 
probability this is, I also ran the same check with the other variables in the model. The result of 
this check can also be seen in Table 3, which shows the percent change, and in Tables 7-10, 
which show the breakdown for each variable, in the appendix. Additionally, the percent change 
is visualized in Figure 1. When Presidential Popularity changes from its minimum to its 
maximum, there is a 14.37% increase in the probability to use force. When Economic Violence 
changes from its minimum to its maximum, there is a 15.62% increase in the probability to use 
force. Finally, when US Power changes from its minimum to its maximum, there is a 10.41% 
decrease in the probability to use force. Thus, threat perception is able to increase the likelihood 
of the use of force at a greater degree than common explanations for the use of force. Overall, 
there is evidence from this model that threat perception is able to substantively increase the 
likelihood of the use of force. 
Figure 1: Graph of the Predicted Probabilities for all variables, ranging from their minimum to 
their maximum. 
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Conclusion 
At the start of this project, the main objective was to investigate the effect of threat 
perception on the use of force. However, it became apparent after a review of the various types 
of proxies for threat perception, that there was not a single variable that actually measured threat 
perception as a psychological variable. While situational factors should certainly be considered, 
none of the previous variables for threat perception were built with reference to threat perception 
as a psychological concept. For that reason, this project also had an objective to create a new 
variable for threat perception. This new variable was derived from three measures of the 
Operational Code to reflect active cognitions that a leader holds in terms of his world view. With 
this new variable, this project split into two parts. The first part was to investigate the effect of 
other psychological variables on threat perception, essentially asking if certain other 
psychological characteristics predispose a leader to a higher level of threat perception. The 
second part then went on to test the new variable and its ability to explain the use of force. 
For the first part of the research, I looked at different psychological characteristics that 
could influence the level of threat perception. Out of the possible characteristics that are part of 
the Leadership Trait Analysis, I hypothesized that need for power, in-group bias, and distrust as 
my explanatory variables would affect the level of threat perception. These variables represent 
deeper personality traits that appear to be at the heart of threat perception. After running the 
models, I found mixed results for these variables. Distrust was the most significant variable and 
followed the direction as set out by my hypothesis: a higher level of distrust would lead to a 
higher level of threat perception. In-group bias was found to be close to significance and in the 
same direction as Distrust. A higher level of In-group bias would lead to a higher level of threat 
perception. 
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While the previous two variables operated in the direction that was predicted in my 
hypotheses, need for power acted in a different way. Though it was significant, a higher need for 
power would lead to a lower level of threat perception. This result was surprising and forced me 
to consider why this variable would operate in the way it did. To try and find an answer, I went 
back to Hermann’s overview of the Leadership Trait Analysis characteristics to see how need for 
power was defined and coded. According to Hermann: 
“Need for power indicates a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one’s 
power or, in other words, the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other 
persons or groups. It is coded by instances when the speaker (1) proposes or engages in a 
strong, forceful action such as an assault or attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a 
reprimand; (2) gives advice or assistance when it is not solicited; (3) attempts to regulate 
the behavior of another person or group; (4) tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with 
someone else so long as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) 
endeavors to impress or gain fame with an action; and (6) is concerned with his or her 
reputation or position.” (Hermann, 2002) 
 
From this definition, we can see that need for power does not translate only to aggression. 
While aggression is certainly a part of it, need for power is made up of other actions that are 
utilized to establish and maintain one’s power. An extension of these actions would be that these 
leaders are adept at negotiation and understanding how to obtain stated goals through multiple 
methods. Because of this, leaders with a high need for power may be able to approach 
threatening situations in a different way.  Rather than go immediately for using force, leaders 
with a high need for power may find different ways to manipulate a situation to fit their own 
goals for maintaining power. Additionally, their ability to negotiate effectively could allow these 
leaders to work out peaceful solutions rather than the alternative.  
In addition, there may be other factors at work here. While only three LTA characteristic 
were examined in this study, there is an additional characteristic that is closely related to need for 
power and helps determine leadership style. This characteristic is belief in the ability to control 
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events. As the name suggests, this characteristic reflects a leader’s belief that he or she is able to 
control the situation as it unfolds. Hermann has noted a few patterns of leadership style 
depending on how these two variables interact. If belief in the ability to control events is lower 
than need for power, then the leader should be able to implement effective strategies to maintain 
power. On the other hand, if belief in the ability to control events is higher than the need for 
power, the leader would want to control everything but would be unable to do it effectively. The 
latter scenario is of interest for this study as a leader who is unable to control situations 
effectively may be more likely to use force. For that reason, a follow up study can look at the 
relationship between these two characteristics and the role that they play in threat perception. 
For the second part of this research, I looked at the ways in which threat perception can 
play a role in determining the use of force. The thinking here is that an increase in the level of 
threat perception will increase the likelihood that a leader will opt to use force in a given 
situation. On the whole, this proposition was supported in the analysis. On its own, threat 
perception was a significant predictor of the use of force. This result was then further supported 
when control variables were added to the model. In the end, the predicted probabilities showed 
that when threat perception went from its minimum to its maximum, the chance of the use of 
force increased by nearly 17%.  
Overall, this project accomplished what it set out to do. A new variable for threat 
perception was created by utilizing three parts of the Operational Code. This variable was shown 
to be related to deeper psychological concepts that predispose the level of threat perception. 
Finally, there is evidence, with and without controls, that higher levels of threat perception 
increase the likelihood of the use of force.  
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The only thing left to consider is what is next. In terms of the constructions of the threat 
perception variable, there can be further investigations into what different psychological aspects 
go into it. Belief in the ability to control events was mentioned earlier, but there are more factors 
in LTA and outside of LTA that could play a part. A leader low in Cognitive complexity (sees 
the world as black and white, rather than gray) may be more inclined towards the use of force 
rather than seeking out other solutions. Outside of LTA, need for affiliation may play a role as a 
leader high in this motive would most likely opt for more peaceful resolution rather than the use 
of force. By looking at more characteristics, we can then determine which characteristics are 
crucial in the development of threat perception. 
In terms of using threat perception as an explanatory variable, there are many different 
avenues of research where it could apply. Going back to the study of war, it may be possible to 
improve on the current results by shortening the dead time period between the time the 
opportunity to use force is open and when the collection of speeches occurs. Through shortening 
this period, it will be possible to bring the measure of threat perception more in tune with what is 
occurring. Threat Perception can also be used in studies of Civil War. Elsewhere, this variable 
can be used to explain other research areas. Such research areas could be in domestic politics by 
examining a president’s relationship with Congress. Other areas could be in examining trade 
relations or studies in alliance formation. Finally, Comparative Politics could play a role by 
examining the ways in which threat perception may change from country to country. While this 
present study of threat perception is concluded, there remain many opportunities for the 
advancement of threat perception and political psychology. 
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Appendix: Additional Tables 
 
Table 4: Cronbach’s alpha result for Threat Perception Variable 
 
Deleted 
Variable 
Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Correlation 
with Total 
Alpha Correlation 
with Total 
Alpha 
P1 0.834364 0.382982 0.767745 0.412423 
P2 0.829488 0.389131 0.7114 0.486877 
P4 0.303942 0.914542 0.298575 0.945638 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlations for LTA variables 
 
 Need for Power In-Group Bias Distrust 
Need for Power 1 0.11907 
(0.005) 
-0.15834 
(0.0002) 
In-Group Bias 0.11907 
(0.005) 
1 0.0987 
(0.02) 
Distrust -0.15834 
(0.0002) 
0.0987 
(0.02) 
1 
Prob > lrl under H0: Rho=0 in parentheses 
 
Table 6: Pearson Correlations for Threat Perception and Control Variables 
 
 Threat 
Perception 
Presidential 
Popularity 
Economic 
Violence 
US Power 
Threat 
Perception 
1 -0.04813 
(0.2576) 
-0.04263 
(0.3161) 
0.08795 
(0.0383) 
Presidential 
Popularity 
-0.04813 
(0.2576) 
1 -0.00651 
(0.8784) 
0.16629 
(<0.0001) 
Economic 
Violence 
-0.04263 
(0.3161) 
-0.00651 
(0.8784) 
1 -0.0955 
(0.0245) 
US Power 0.08795 
(0.0383) 
0.16629 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0955 
(0.0245) 
1 
 Prob > lrl under H0: Rho=0 in parentheses 
 
 
Table 7: Predicted probabilities for threat perception, ranging from -4.76 to +6.73. All other 
variables held constant at their mean values. 
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error Confidence Limits 
Minimum 0.7021 0.0902 0.5082 0.8509 
Maximum 0.8714 0.0613 0.7126 0.9559 
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Table 8: Predicted probabilities for Presidential popularity, ranging from 24 to 82. All other 
variables held constant at their mean values. 
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error Confidence Limits 
Minimum 0.699 0.0961 0.4923 0.8560 
Maximum 0.8427 0.0648 0.6836 0.9375 
 
Table 9: Predicted probabilities for US Power, ranging from 0.1355 to 0.3536. All other 
variables held constant at their mean values. 
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error Confidence Limits 
Minimum 0.8108 0.0674 0.6527 0.9145 
Maximum 0.7067 0.1030 0.4829 0.8708 
 
Table 10: Predicted probabilities for Economic Violence, ranging from 0 to 1. All other variables 
held constant at their mean values. 
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error Confidence Limits 
Minimum 0.7815 0.0711 0.6197 0.8944 
Maximum 0.9377 0.0588 0.7244 0.9933 
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